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This paper demonstrates that in an economy with moral hazard and more than one commodity, 
competitive equilibrium is not constrained-efficient. To correct the market failure, differential 
commodity taxation is necessary. A general optimal tax formula is derived, and special cases of 
it discussed. 
1. Introduction 
There has been increasing awareness over the past fifteen years of the 
importance and pervasiveness of problems of moral hazard. Risk-averse 
individuals purchase insurance which affects their incentives to undertake 
accident-avoidance activities. With perfect (costless) information, insurance 
contracts would specify the actions to be undertaken and provide complete 
insurance. With costly information, however, insurance contracts provide 
only partial insurance, balancing at the margin the loss in reduced incentives 
from providing more insurance and the gain from risk-sharing. Moral hazard 
problems arise not only in insurance markets, but also in labor, product, and 
capital markets, in all of which elements of implicit or explicit insurance are 
prevalent in contractual relations. 
In this paper we establish that, with more than one consumer good and 
costless government intervention, competitive equilibrium is almost always 
(constrained) inefficient when moral hazard is present; and to correct the 
market failure, differential commodity taxation is necessary. 
The rationale for this result is as follows. Consider the extreme moral 
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hazard situation, in which the insurer can observe only the outcome of an 
accident and has no information on either the underlying state of nature or 
the precaution taken by the individual to prevent the accident. In this case, 
the insurer can do no better than to provide insurance against the accident 
per se (i.e. he cannot make the payout contingent on either the insured’s 
actions or the state of nature). As a result, the individual will normally take 
less care than is socially desirable. This in itself does not imply constrained 
inefficiency; all it says is that the unobservability of accident-prevention 
activities entails a welfare cost. Now consider the effect in the economy with 
moral hazard of subsidizing those goods that are complementary to accident- 
avoidance activities, and taxing those goods that are substitutable for them. 
The individual will undertake more accident-prevention activity, which will 
reduce the welfare cost associated with being insufficiently careful. However, 
such commodity taxation, by causing prices to diverge from marginal costs, 
introduces a second welfare cost. Constrained efficiency obtains when the 
sum of the two welfare costs is minimized, and we establish that this does 
involve differential commodity taxation. 1 Put another way: When insurance 
is provided in the presence of moral hazard, the insured faces the marginal 
social cost of accident prevention, but since he is insured, his marginal 
private benefit is typically less than marginal social benefit. As a result, he 
will take less than the socially optimal amount of care. This can be corrected 
by lowering the private cost of accident prevention. 
The rationale for differential commodity taxation here is different from 
that in the conventional optimal tax literature [e.g. Atkinson and Stiglitz 
(1980)]. There, the tax authorities would like to tax individuals according to 
say ability, but this is presumed to be unobservable and as a result the tax 
authorities must tax observable items, which include commodities, on the 
basis of their correlation with ability. If individuals were identical, it would 
be efficient to impose lump-sum taxation; differential commodity taxation 
would be harmful. Here, however, even with identical individuals so that 
lump-sum taxation is possible, one will want to impose differential commod- 
ity taxation. 
We organize our discussion as follows. Section 2 presents the general 
model, while section 3 examines a couple of special.cases. In section 4 we 
discuss a few of the possible policy applications of our analysis. And sections 
5 and 6 give concluding comments. 
‘It appears to have been the conventional wisdom that moral hazard does not cause 
constrained inefficiency. This belief is based on the results of Pauly (1974), Stiglitz (1974), 
Helpman and Laffont (1975), Marshall (1976), and Shave11 (1979a, 1979b) among others, all of 
which assume that there is a single consumer good, a linear production technology, and 
observability of an individual’s total insurance purchases. In Arnott and Stiglitz (1984b) we 
showed that constrained efficiency obtains under these assumptions, but not when any of them 
is relaxed. 
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2. The general model 
We start by considering a general formulation of the optimal tax problem 
with moral hazard. This will give insight into the structure of the problem. 
Unfortunately, the first-order conditions (as in the conventional optimal 
commodity tax problem), though interpretable, are sufficiently complex that 
they provide little guidance concerning the optimal tax rates on the various 
goods. As a consequence, in the next section we treat two special cases, both 
of which focus on a different determinant of the optimal tax structure. 
We assume that there is a single representative risk-averse individual in the 
economy for whom there are I possible outcomes indexed by i.2S3 Outcomes 
are differentiated on the basis of which of a variety of kinds of accidents 
befall the individual, and the damage associated with each of the accidents. 
The outcome may affect the individual either directly (giving him pain or 
pleasure and affecting his tastes) or via his gross (of insurance premium and 
payout) income. 
For simplicity, in this paper we assume that an individual’s total purchases 
of a commodity are unobservable; this implies that only linear taxation is 
feasible, and that the insurer cannot write his insurance contingent on an 
individual’s purchases. Thus, the insurer can do no better than choose the 
net payout (payout minus premium) for each outcome, some of which may 
be negative. We will, however, assume throughout that the government and 
the market can observe the total quantity of insurance which an individual 
purchases4 To simplify the analysis, we treat a linear production technology, 
and measure produced goods in such a way that all producer prices are 
unity. 
A doubling of all consumer prices and net (of net payout) incomes in this 
economy has no effect. We therefore require another normalization. There is 
no obviously preferable one. We shall employ different normalizations in 
different parts of the paper. In this section, we normalize on the basis of the 
individual’s net income if no accident befalls him. 
We distinguish between goods (ck) which can be taxed and activities (2) 
which cannot.5 We let i denote the outcome (i=O corresponds to no 
accident),‘j Xi the individual’s net insurance payout with outcomes i, yi gross 
‘Thus we rule out problems associated with adverse selection. 
3Alternatively, one may interpret the model as applying to an economy with a large number 
of ex ante identical individuals whose accident outcomes are statistically independent. 
%ome problems which arise when this is not so are treated at length in Arnott and Stiglitz 
(1984b). 
‘The analysis can be extended to the case where there are goods which cannot be taxed. 
60~r notation admits multiple accident outcomes; thus if there were two types of accidents, 
tire and automobile, then we might let i= 1 denote a fire, i=2 an automobile accident, and i= 3 
both. Our notation also admits accidents of varying sizes, though for simplicity, we have limited 
ourselves to a finite number of outcomes. 
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income (yO = 1) and 
zi=yi+xi (1) 
the individual’s net of insurance income with outcome i. 
Some goods are purchased before the accident occurs, and some after. 
Commodities (and their prices) purchased prior to the accident are denoted 
with a caret while commodities purchased after are denoted with a bar. 
Clearly, only purchases prior to the accident can affect the probability of the 
accident.’ For simplicity, we shall assume all non-taxable activities occur 
prior to the accident.* Thus, n, the probability of outcome i, is (where e and 
2 are column vectors) 
ni = Pi(t 4, (2) 
while utility with outcome i is 
ui = ui(ci, e), (3) 
where dui/@ > 0, a2ui/a(c~)’ ~0, and Z@/aej<O and ci (with no bar or caret) 
denotes the column vector of both pre- and post-outcome goods with 
outcome i. Note that we allow tastes to depend on the outcome. Expected 
utility is 
EU =T Pii’, e)ui(ci, 4. (4) 
With outcome i, the individual’s budget constraint is 
zi = qci, (5) 
where q is the row vector of consumer prices. 
2.1. The consumers’ problem 
The individual’s budget allocation can be described as a two-stage process. 
Prior to the realization of the outcome he purchases the vector 2. After 
realization i, he therefore has Zi=zi -@ to spend. He chooses Ci to maximize 
ui(Ci;&e) subject to qci=Zi. We denote the solution to this by the (outcome- 
contingent) quasi-indirect utility function v,(Z,, 4; 2, e). He then chooses e and 
‘This formulation here obviously involves collapsing a multi-period problem into a single- 
period analysis; for our purposes, there is no loss in doing so. 
‘If there are untaxed activities during the post-accident period, we can incorporate their effects 
into a derived (indirect) utility function. 
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s.t. 
zi = zi - QC. (6) 
We assume here and throughout the rest of this paper that there is a 
unique, interior maximum to each of the maximization problems considered. 
This is admittedly a very strong assumption; a unique, interior optimum is 
not guaranteed in the conventional optimal commodity taxation problem, 
and moral hazard may cause even the consumer’s maximization problem to 
be non-convex [see Arnott and Stiglitz (1984a)]. 
The first-order conditions to (6) are 
and 
(7) 
In (7), ~i(dpi/~ej)u, is the expected marginal benefit in utiles from a unit 
increase in effort j, while ~,pi(&,/dej) is the corresponding marginal cost. Eq. 
(8) has an analogous interpretation. 9 We can therefore obtain commodity 
demand and effort supply functions e=e(q, z), 2=E(q, z) and Ci=Ci(q, z). 
Substituting these equations into (4) gives: 
EU = C ni(q, Z) Uq, Z). (9) 





‘Note that this formulation of the consumer’s problem assumes that if an individuSlr I~L~~~II.I\L\ 
a good, he will use it. We retain this assumption in the text. But with this assumption. the 
optimal consumer price of a good can be negative. This can occur when the individual is better 
off if the accident occurs; to induce him to take care it is necessary to set the price of accident- 
prevention goods negative. 
In appendix B we adopt the alternative assumption that an individual need not use a good he 
purchases. If this alternative assumption were used in the text, the planner’s problem would be 
augmented by the constraints q > 0. 
“‘From (6) 8EU/dx, = 3EU/&$ = a#, = cqq. 
‘IFrom (6), 8EU/d@= -~ip&~ui/&J = -&q&z, and dEU/ab=Cipi(dui/aqk). Also, 
&+/a$ = - &;. Thus 3EU/dq’= -xi iq&. 
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and 
fg= -T Cf7cicci. (11) 
2.2. The social planner’s problem 
The social planner is assumed not to be able to control consumption or 
accident-prevention activities directly, but only indirectly - he can control 
the insurance vector, x, and the prices of commodities, 4. 
The economy-wide resource constraint facing the planner is 
where 1 is the unit row vector. Using the individual’s budget 




which states that (expected) net insurance payouts must equal (expected) tax 
revenues. 
The planner’s problem may then be written as 
max C7Ciq-2 C 7li(Xi-(q-1)Ci) 1 , 
q,x i (i / 
where A is the Lagrange multiplier on (12). Define 
to be the net subsidy with outcome 
written more compactly as 






It turns out that the relevant ‘compensated’ derivative in the optimal tax 
formula entails compensation such that, after the change, the individual is 
able to purchase his pre-change, outcome-contingent bundles of goods and 
no more, which preserves expected utility;” thus, where a subscript 8 
12 
dElJ (-1 dErJ aEU =-+ccf,= -_Cai7cic~+~&gc,=0. w 8 w i , i i 
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denotes such compensation: 
and 
(16) 




Let c denote a matrix with elements 
1 
Cl 
c; . . . 
2 (; > Cl 
and define (&/t3q”;)e accordingly; let rc denote a column vector with elements 
rci and define (&ci/aq’)e accordingly; and finally let s denote a row vector with 
elements si. Then (17) may be rewritten as 
(19) 
Eq. (19) has two intuitively appealing interpretations. First, it states that at 
the optimum, the change in net government revenues from a compensated 
unit increase in q’ is zero. l3 Second, it confirms our claim in the introduction 
that with the optimal set of taxes, the marginal welfare cost associated with 
consumer prices diverging from producer prices [the RHS of (19)] equals the 
marginal welfare cost associated with moral hazard (the LHS). 
The first te& is, by the definition of 0, zero. Thus, (aR/~?q”;)~ = 0 is equivalent to (19). 
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Proposition 1. The optimal tax-cum-insurance structure may be character- 
ized in two ways. First, the change in net government revenue from a 
‘compensated’ unit increase in any tax rate must be zero. Second, for each 
tax rate, the marginal welfare cost associated with moral hazard must equal 
that associated with the wedges between consumer and producer prices. 
It is straightforward to convert (19) into a simple formula for the optimal 
tax structure. Define A to be a matrix with elements ilE,k=Ci(aC:/dq’)g7i, 
and Z to be a matrix with elements Zc,i =(&ci/Zqk)e. Then (19) can be 
written as 
Eq. (18) states that with the optimal tax structure, the absolute reduction 
in the consumption of good k” resulting from the optimal tax system is 
approximately equal to the welfare cost associated with moral hazard from a 
unit increase in the tax on good k: This is analogous to the Ramsey- 
Samuelson proportional reduction formula. Here, however, lump-sum trans- 
fers (the x’s) are allowed. 
2.3. Decentralizability of the constrained optimum 
It is easy to verify that in general (20) implies q# 1 (this will be apparent 
from the special cases treated in the next section). This, in turn, implies that 
competitive equilibrium without government intervention is not a con- 
strained Pareto optimum. 
If the government imposes the set of taxes (q*) computed according to 
(20), but lets the market provide insurance, will the resulting competitive 
equilibrium be efficient? There are two obvious potential problems. First, the 
social optimum may entail overall losses or profits from insurance; this can 
be handled by imposing a lump-sum tax on consumers which is equivalent to 
imposing a per-client tax on insurers. Second, because of non-convexities, 
firms could, depending on the disequilibrium adjustment mechanism, settle at 
a local rather than the global optimum. This would not occur if firms 
competed ‘aggressively’. There is another difficulty. Insurance companies 
ignore the effect of the policies they offer on government tax revenue. They 
face the minimization problem 
min C ni(4*, X + Y)Cxi + Yi) 
x i 
s.t. 
1 ni(4*7 x+y)K(q*,x+y)=EU, 
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T 71i(C? *,x+y)I’Jq*,x+y)=EU. 
One can react in at least three ways to this non-decentralizability result. 
First, one may view it as demonstrating that for constrained efficiency, it is 
necessary not only to have commodity taxation but also to have the 
government undertake all insurance. Second, one can interpret it as demon- 
strating that the market can be used to supply insurance efficiently, but the 
government must provide the firms with a conditional revenue subsidy 
R=R(x)=xi ni(q*, x + y)(q* - l)ci(q*, x + y). Third, one may argue that the 
government is an inefficient provider of insurance or could not properly 
compute R(x), so that one should set up the planning problem such that the 
planner has control ‘of q, but only indirect control of x. We are agnostic 
concerning the interpretation of the above non-decentralizability result. In 
any event, it is of interest to ask how the optimal tax formula is altered if, for 
whatever reason, the government can set only commodity taxes and has only 
indirect control over insurance companies via taxes. 
With private sector provision of insurance, we have a three-tier problem. 
At the bottom, we have the consumer who chooses effort and consumption, 
taking consumer prices and the terms of insurance as given. Above we have 
the insurance companies which choose the terms of insurance, taking 
consumer prices as given, but taking into account how their clients vary 
effort in response to changes in the insurance contract. And finally, at the top 
is the government which sets consumer prices, taking into account how firms 
will respond, and also how consumers will respond both directly and 
through induced changes in the insurance contract. 
In the two-tier optimal tax problem where the government controls both 
net insurance payouts and tax rates, the optimal tax formulae contain first- 
and second-order derivatives of the outcome-contingent utility function and 
the probability of accident function. In the three-tier problem outlined above, 
the optimal tax formulae would contain first-, second-, and third-order 
partial derivatives of the utility and probability-of-accident functions. Thus, 
the determinants of optimal taxes in the three-tier problem are ‘an order 
more complicated’ than in the two-tier problem, for example depending on 
the rate of change of elasticities in addition to elasticities. 
We shall not derive the optimal tax formulae for the case where the 
market provides insurance, and in the rest of the paper shall continue to 
assume that the government provides insurance. In some contexts, such as 
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the optimal taxation of cigarettes when medical care is socialized, this 
assumption is prima facie reasonable. In other contexts, it may not be; how 
misleading it is to compute optimal taxes assuming that the government 
provides insurance when in fact the market does so is an empirical issue. 
3. Some simple cases 
3.1. Accident-prevention effort and equipment, and separable, outcome- 
independent utility 
In this subsection we consider an economy in which there is a consump- 
tion good, c, which does not affect the probability of accident directly, an 
accident-prevention good, J; which does not affect utility directly, and a 
single kind of effort, e, and in which there are only two possible outcomes - 
either a fixed-damage accident occurs or it does not. We assume that the 
planner has direct control of prices and insurance. Since expected utility is 
homogeneous of degree zero in consumer prices and income, we are allowed 
an additional normalization, and assume the consumer price of the consumer 
good to be unity. (Recall that all producer prices are unity.) And let q, 
without a subscript, denote the consumer price of the accident-prevention 
good. Note that, with this normalization, either the accident-prevention good 
will be taxed and insurance subsidized or vice versa. 
We employ the same notation as in the previous section, except that, since 
we now have only one kind of each commodity, we drop superscripts. We 
adopt the convention that ye> y,. Thus, the size of the fixed-damage 
accident is y, - y,. Finally, we assume that utility is separable and outcome- 
independent. Thus, where rc is the probability of accident, expected utility is 
EU=(1-4e, f)Myo +x0 -q.f) + x(e, fMy, +x1 -qf)--e, (21) 
and the economy’s resource constraint is 
Applying (20) to this problem gives:i4 
(23) 
Since utility is outcome-independent, the individual receives a larger net 
payout if the accident occurs than if it does not, i.e. x1 >xo. Ordinarily, 
14Note that the derivation of (20) did not depend on the normalization employed in the 
previous section. Thus, (20) is applicable here even though a different normalization is employed. 
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increasing the price of the accident-prevention good will discourage its 
purchase and increase the probability of an accident. In this case, the 
accident-prevention good should be subsidized. It seems plausible, however, 
that there are situations where the accident-prevention good should be taxed; 
e.g. driving a safer car may make an individual so much more complacent at 
the wheel that the probability of accident increases. Let us investigate this 
possibility further. It can be shown that (af/a&<0.i5 Combining this result 
with x1 >xO implies that q- 1 has the opposite sign to (%/8q),. Now, 
7ce(U1-u~)-1 =o, (24a) 
where rc, = (&c/&), etc. and 
From total differentiation of (24a) and (24b), one obtains that (&c/8q& has 
the same sign as 
(25) 
We know that 71, < 0, nf ~0, u0 > ui, u; > ub (since utility is separable and 
outcome-independent and only partial insurance is provided) and rc,, >O 
[from (24a)]. Thus, the expression in (25) and thereafter (&c/cYq), can be 
negative only if 7tef is much greater than the zero, i.e. if the accident- 
prevention good substantially reduces the marginal efficiency of effort ( -71,). 
We say that an accident-prevention good for which this holds is very effort- 
retarding. Note that this property can be consistent with the second-order 
conditions of the individual’s maximization problem. 
The sign of [z~-(Q.z,/z~,)] depends on the ‘normality’ of accident- 
prevention equipment in the probability-of-accident function, namely if a 
decrease in the probability of accident, holding the ‘relative price’ of effort 
and accident-prevention equipment fixed, is most efficiently achieved with an 
increase (decrease) in accident-prevention equipment, then such equipment is 
normal (inferior). Inferiority is necessary but not sufficient for an accident- 
prevention good to be very effort-retarding.16 Fig. 1 portrays a normal and 
an inferior accident-prevention good. 
We present the result of this subsection in: 
ISThis follows directly by differentiating the first-order conditions for e and f, making the 
appropriate compensation. 
16A very effort-retarding good is roughly analogous to a Giffen good. 
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e NORMAL e INFERIOR 
ACCIDENT PREVENTION GOOD 
Fig. 1. Normal and inferior accident-prevention goods 
Proposition 2. In the economy treated in this subsection (two outcomes; 
separable, outcome-independent utility; a single consumer good; a single 
accident-prevention good which can be taxed linearly; and accident- 
prevention effort which is untaxable), the accident-prevention good should be 
taxed if it is very effort-retarding and subsidized otherwise.” 
3.2. Accident-prevention effort and more than one consumer good 
The economy to be treated in this subsection is like that of the previous 
subsection except that instead of one consumer good and one accident- 
prevention good there are two consumer goods, a and b, neither of which 
affects the probability of an accident. Having set all producer prices equal to 
unity, we choose good a as the numeraire, and let 4 denote the consumer 
price of good b. Since yi + xi = c; + 4~: from the consumer’s budget constraint, 
utility with outcome i is ui[yi+xi-qcp, cf, e]. In this case, (20) becomes: 
“In interpreting the models of this subsection we have treated outcome 0 as ‘no accident’ and 
outcome 1 as ‘accident’. We could just as well, however, have assumed that an accident always 
occurs, and that the amount of effort affects the damage caused by the accident. In this case, 
instead of speaking of accident-prevention goods and effort, one would want to speak of 
damage-reducing goods and effort. Fire extinguishers and seat belts are two obvious examples of 
damage-reducing goods. Thus, one wants to subsidize fire extinguishers as long as doing so does 
not make the individual much more careless. 
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where n is the probability of accident. Assume for the sake of argument that 
good b is more complementary with effort than good a in the sense that 
(&r/L&&,>0 - a rise in the relative price of good b discourages effort. 
Normally, we expect that si >O> s0 - the net subsidy when the accident 
occurs is larger than when it does not. In this case, since (&$/&& and 
(&~/aq)O are both negative, q- 1~0, and good b should be subsidized. This 
accords with the intuition that one wants to subsidize goods that are 
complementary to effort. 
But (26) also points out that there can be exceptions to this intuition. If 
the net subsidy is smaller when the accident occurs than when it does not 
(sO > O>s,), then goods that are more complementary to effort should be 
taxed. In this case, the individual expends too much effort at accident 
prevention, and hence effort should be discouraged.” This case is something 
of a curiosum, but it can occur when the accident is very marginal-utility- 
decreasing (CJV,/az>>aV,/az for all z) numbing the victim’s capacity to 
experience pain or pleasure. We summarize this result in: 
Proposition 3. In the economy treated in this subsection (two outcomes: two 
consumer goods which can be taxed linearly; and accident-prevention effort 
which is untaxable), the consumer good which is more complementary to 
effort should be subsidized, except if the net social subsidy is higher when the 
accident does not occur in which case it should be taxed.” 
4. Some policy applications 
There are a host of current policy issues to which our analysis is 
applicable. Indeed, because of the pervasiveness of moral hazard, there is 
potential scope for government intervention in virtually all markets. In a few 
markets, however, the distortions caused by the provision of insurance seem 
sufficiently large that the appropriate ways of ameliorating them merit 
individual attention. 
“This argument can be formalized as follows. Suppose effort were observable. Then the 
optimal amount of effort would solve: 
max Y=(l -n(e))u,(c&cb,,e)+x(e)u,(d;,c~,e) 
@$c:.P,.<,e 
-n((l-n(e))(c~+cb,-~,)+~(e)(~;+c~-_y~)), 
In competitive equilibrium with moral hazard, the term in the first curly brackets equals zero. 
Thus, at the competitive equilibrium, aZ/&= i.x,(s, -sl) i 0, so a welfare improvement would 
be made by decreasing effort. 
“This intuitive statement of the result is strictly correct only when the consumer good which 
is less complementary to effort is the numeraire. 
14 R. Arnott and J.E. Stiglitz, Moral hazard 
4.1. Automobile accidents 
There is a general consensus that automobile insurance, if it has not 
significantly increased the probability of an accident occurring, has increased 
the average size of accident damage. 
We have seen that the structure of optimal taxation is complicated by 
interdependencies between and within the probability-of-outcome and 
outcome-contingent utility functions. In the discussion which follows, we 
ignore these complications. Then the optimal tax structure will involve: 
taxing gasoline2’ (t o encourage people to drive less), taxing alcohol (to 
encourage people to drive more carefully), imposing penalties on careless 
driving, subsidizing maintenance, taxing cars, with a higher tax on less safe 
and more expensive cars, subsidizing coffee breaks (to encourage people to 
be more alert when driving), and imposing penalties for not wearing seat 
belts. One might also want to tax complements and subsidize substitutes. 
This could involve subsidizing alternative modes of transport. Accidents on 
these alternative modes are insured against, and this insurance too is 
characterized by moral hazard. But one suspects that, per passenger-mile, the 
deadweight loss associated with moral hazard is higher for private cars than 
for other forms of transportation. 
The taxation of body repair is a superfluous policy. Any outcome the 
government can achieve via the taxation (not necessarily linear) of body- 
work or, more generally, accident damage repair, it can also achieve by 
varying payouts.‘l 
4.2. Social security 
Diamond and Mirrlees (1978) consider an economy in which individuals 
are ex ante identical, but some, as they age, develop disabilities which make 
early retirement more attractive. The problem faced by the government is 
how to design social security when it cannot ascertain the extent to which a 
particular individual is disabled. The more attractive are provisions for early 
retirement, the more insurance is provided the disabled, but at the same time, 
the more attractive it becomes for able individuals to retire ‘too early’. 
The probability distribution of retirement ages is analogous to the 
probability distribution of accident damages in our model (with earlier 
retirement corresponding to higher damage). Consumption in different 
periods is analogous to different goods in our model. Consumption in earlier 
periods is damage-reducing since it causes the individual to save less, which 
‘Owe have adopted the most intuitive normalization: those goods the level of consumption of 
which has no effect on the probability of accident have a unit consumer price. 
2’There is another important moral hazard phenomenon in this context. Both the accident 
victim and the repair company have an incentive to inflate the repair bill (splitting the excess of 
claimed over actual repair costs). 
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makes retiring less attractive; and similarly, consumption in later periods is 
damage-increasing. Relative to the symmetric information optimum, the 
provision of social security causes too many people to retire at too early an 
age. The deadweight loss associated with this can be reduced by subsidizing 
consumption when young and taxing consumption when old, or more 
straightforwardly by taxing savings. This discourages saving, which makes an 
individual less inclined to retire. 
One could enrich the Diamond-Mirrlees model to allow for different types 
of goods. In such an economy one might want to subsidize those goods that 
encourage later retirement of the able, and tax those that encourage earlier 
retirement. One might therefore want to subsidize companies’ attempts to 
improve working conditions, and tax goods that are complementary to 
retirement interests. 
4.3. Medical insurance 
The government should tax those goods and activities that are conducive 
to ill health, and subsidize those associated with good health. Some such 
measures are already in effect in most developed countries. The taxation of 
alcohol and cigarettes is an example, though it is doubtful whether the 
principal aim of these taxes was the reduction in the deadweight loss from 
the moral hazard associated with the provision of medical insurance. The 
subsidization of preventive medical care and light exercise and the taxation 
of high cholesterol food might be warranted. Non-preventive medical care is 
analogous to body-work. 
4.4. Sharecropping and other principal-agent problems 
Most economists have a good understanding of what moral hazard is, but 
it is our feeling that the importance and ubiquity of moral hazard tend to be 
underestimated. For almost all risks, the probability of accident or the size of 
damage conditional on the accident occurring is affected by the victim’s 
actions which are only imperfectly observable. As a result, insurance markets 
against virtually every risk are incomplete or absent. And when an insurance 
market is incomplete, institutions frequently develop that provide non- 
market insurance, perhaps explicit, perhaps implicit, perhaps formal, perhaps 
informal. Thus, moral hazard is present not only in insurance markets, but in 
these numerous social institutions as well. 
Besides market insurance, informal insurance, and government-provided 
insurance, there is another large class of institutions which provide (implicit) 
insurance-principal-agent relationship. An example which has been ex- 
tensively discussed is the landlord-tenant contract [Stiglitz (1974) for 
example]. The moral hazard problem is that the provision of implicit 
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insurance to the agricultural laborer discourages effort. The deadweight loss 
associated with this can be reduced by subsidizing complements to effort. 
Thus, if a happy worker is a good worker, it might benefit the landlord to 
construct entertainment facilities. And if there is a problem with workers 
spending too much time at the local cafe, prices should be raised. Since 
indebtedness and purchases of inputs may both affect effort, they too should 
be taxed or subsidized. The attempt to internalize these ‘externalities’ leads to 
interlinkage of land, labor, credit, and commodity markets [Braverman and 
Stiglitz (1982) and Mitra (1983)]. Other familiar principal-agent relationships 
are those between employer and employee (the implicit contracts literature), 
borrower and lender [e.g. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)], and physician and 
patient [e.g. Arrow (1965)]. 
5. Some comments 
5.1. Magnitude of welfare loss 
The reader will no doubt have asked himself: (a) how significant is the 
deadweight loss associated with the various forms of moral hazard we have 
discussed; (b) what is the approximate magnitude of taxes and subsidies 
based on these considerations; (c) how are the optimal tax and subsidy rates 
to be computed; and (d) may not the administrative and other costs of 
imposing a complex system of taxes and subsidies to reduce the deadweight 
loss associated with moral hazard exceed the benefits? The simple answer is 
that neither the theoretical nor the empirical work that would be required to 
answer these questions has been done. Insurance actuaries probably have a 
good idea of how responsive the probability of a particular accident is to the 
parameters of the insurance contract. But this datum reflects not only moral 
hazard, but also adverse selection; as the contract is modified, not only may 
each client alter his accident-prevention behavior, but also the client popu- 
lation may change. Since the welfare properties of economies with both 
moral hazard and adverse selection have not yet been investigated, we do not 
know what actuarial-data would be necessary to compute the deadweight 
loss associated with moral hazard-cum-adverse selection nor how to under- 
take the computation. 
Our intuition is that the deadweight loss due to moral hazard is probably 
important enough in some contexts, most notably health, theft, fire, auto- 
mobile accidents, social security, and unemployment insurance, to warrant 
corrective taxation. 
5.2. Pecuniary externalities matter 
To say that a good should be taxed is equivalent to saying that the 
shadow price of the good exceeds its market price. This statement has an 
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interesting implication. In an economy with moral hazard, pecuniary external- 
ities ‘matter’; by ‘matter’ we mean that government intervention is justified 
to internalize the externality. In a classic competitive economy, pecuniary 
externalities do not matter since the social benefit associated with the 
marginal unit equals the social cost. The purchase of the marginal unit 
causes prices to change throughout the economy, which induces a string of 
marginal reallocations. But since the social benefit of each of these marginal 
reallocations equals the social cost, the pecuniary externality creates no 
deadweight loss. In an economy with moral hazard, however, since the social 
benefit of the marginal reallocations is not in general equal to the corres- 
ponding social cost, pecuniary externalities alter the aggregate deadweight 
loss in the economy and thus matter. 
5.3. The invisible hand is clumsy, but so is the government 
The welfare properties of economies with moral hazard are markedly 
different from those of Arrow-Debreu economies. Notably, the Invisible 
Hand Theorem fails to hold in economies with moral hazard. Since there are 
elements of moral hazard in virtually all markets, this suggests a limited 
domain of applicability of the Fundamental Theorem of Welfare 
Economics.” 
In suggesting that there is scope for government intervention, it should be 
emphasized that we have ignored the costs of government intervention. These 
may, however, be substantial and exceed any possible efficiency gains from 
differential commodity taxation. In this case, even though shadow prices 
deviate from market prices, the market allocation, since it cannot be 
improved upon, must be said to be constrained efficient. Hence, the market 
failures we identify should be interpreted as potential market failures, 
becoming actual market failures only when the benefits of government 
intervention exceed the costs.23 
5.4. Differences between government and private firms 
If firms could observe individual’s total purchases, then they could sell 
“See Arnott and Stiglitz (1984b) for a more extensive discussion of the welfare economics of 
moral hazard. 
23The traditional welfare theorems assert that no government intervention could improve 
upon the market allocation; since not even an ‘ideal’ government could do better than the 
market, one did not need to model precisely the ‘imperfect’ governments. Our contention here is 
that the market fails this stringent test; an ideal government could effect improvements. But to 
fail the more relevant test, of whether actual government intervention would likely improve 
welfare necessitates modelling the costs of government intervention and government behavior. 
Thus, constrained efficiency should be defined not only contingent on the information 
acquisition technology, or more restrictively on what information is and is not available to 
whom, but also treating market structure as endogenous and taking into account the technology 
of government intervention. 
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total packages to individuals, tieing their purchases of commodities and 
insurance. In this case, government intervention would be unnecessary since 
there is no allocation the government could achieve which firms could not 
also. 
If, however, an individual’s total purchases of commodities are not 
observable, then even when the government has no informational advantage 
over firms, it can improve on the market equilibrium. Competitive firms have 
no choice but to price goods at cost; any firm which tried to do what the tax 
system does, pricing some goods above cost and subsidizing others, would 
make a loss since individuals would purchase the subsidized goods but not 
the others. The government, however, through its coercive powers of taxation 
is able to drive a wedge between producer and consumer prices. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we have made a simple yet, we believe, important point: in 
competitive equilibrium (with no government intervention) in an economy with 
asymmetric information, shadow prices will generally deviate from market 
prices. There is a welfare loss associated with the informational asymmetries, 
the size of which depends on individuals’ consumption patterns. If increased 
consumption of a good reduces this welfare loss, the good should be 
subsidized whenever the reduction in welfare loss exceeds the costs of 
government intervention. 
We investigated a particular case of this general proposition.24 We 
considered an economy with identical individuals, in which the presence of 
asymmetric information gave rise to moral hazard. And we considered the 
determinants of the optimal tax structure in such an economy. Broadly 
speaking, our results accorded with intuition. The moral hazard arising from 
the provision of insurance usually causes people to self-protect too little, so 
those goods whose consumption encourage an individual to self-protect 
more/less should be subsidized/taxed. Thus, fire extinguishers should be 
subsidized if having a fire extinguisher reduces accident damage, while 
alcohol should be taxed if its consumption causes individuals to drive more 
recklessly. Some of our results, however, are not immediately obvious. First, 
we demonstrated that there are circumstances, albeit improbable, in which 
accident-prevention goods and consumer goods that are complementary to 
accident-prevention effort should be taxed. Second, we showed that as in the 
optimal commodity tax problem, the determination of the optimal tax 
structure is far from straightforward. And third, the structure of optimal 
taxes depends on whether insurance is provided by the government or the 
market. 
*4The general proposition itself is examined in greater generality in Greenwald and Stiglitz 
(1982). 
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There are three obviously worthwhile extensions to our analysis. We 
treated information as if it were either costless or infinitely costly to acquire; 
as a result, something was either perfectly observable or unobservable. One 
would like to treat explicitly the costs of acquiring insurance-relevant 
information,25 particularly since one could then determine the circumstances 
under which such information acquisition should be subsidized. The analysis 
should also be extended to treat adverse selection and moral hazard 
simultaneously. Not only would this alter the optimal tax structure in 
interesting ways, but also the development of such a model is a necessary 
condition for both sound, qualitative policy advice, and for the empirical 
estimation necessary to compute optimal tax rates. Finally, we derived 
optimal tax formulae for the situation where the government provides 
insurance. It would be useful, but difficult, to perform the same exercise when 
the market rather than the government provides insurance. 
The belief that an unregulated market (and spontaneous non-market 
institutions) provides many forms of insurance in an inefficient manner is 
widespread, at least among policy makers and the lay public, and has given 
rise to extensive government intervention vis-a-vis insurance. This paper and 
Arnott and Stiglitz (1984b) have provided a theoretical basis for this belief, 
and have indicated at least some of the factors that should be considered in 
determining appropriate corrective action by the government. 
Appendix A: Derivation of eqs. (17) and (18) 
From (13’): 
Thus using (10): 
a2 azi asi 







‘sThe collection of information has been studied by Holmstrom (1979) and Shave11 (1979a) 
but for simple economies with moral hazard in which competitive equilibrium is constrained 
efficient. 
The transmission of information, in particular whether firms have an incentive to share 
information on their common clients is the focus of Hellwig (1982). 
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Using (11) and adding (ii) and (iii) gives: 
From (14): 
and 
Substituting (va) and (vb) into (iv) gives: 
Now define: 
and 








Now define the outcome-contingent expenditure function Ei = E,(q; q), and the 
fixed-probability expenditure function E(q; 7ci, q) =ci CiEi(q; i$. Then 
Applying (ix) to (viii) gives: 
(ix) 
(xl 
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Appendix B 
In this appendix we treat an economy in which there is a single accident- 
prevention good f which enters the accident-probability function but not the 
utility function, and a single consumer good which enters the utility function 
but not the accident-probability function, and no accident-prevention effort. 
Though this case is of little practical relevance since there is always some 
unobservable accident-affecting activity, it has some peculiar characteristics 
worth noting. Where an accident is defined as being relatively-utility- 
decreasing or relatively-utility-increasing according to whether uO > u1 or 
uO < u1 whenever i&Jay, = &Jay,,, we obtain:26 
(i) if the accident is relatively-utility-decreasing, the symmetric information 
optimum can be achieved by the government; 
(ii) if utility is outcome-independent, the symmetric information optimum 
can almost (arbitrarily closely) be achieved by the government providing the 
accident-prevention good at an arbitrarily low but positive price: and 
(iii) if the accident is relatively-utility-increasing, the symmetric information 
optimum cannot normally be achieved. The asymmetric information opt- 
imum is achieved by the government providing the accident-prevention good 
at an arbitrarily low price. 
The symmetric information optimum, in which the planner can directly 
control the individual’s purchases, is the solution to 




and is characterized by the resource constraint (Bl.i), 
(B.2a) 
and 
Xf((% -%I)-act -YA 4% -Yd) = u’. (B.2b) 
We now examine the asymmetric information optimum in which the 
planner can only indirectly influence the individual’s purchases of c and f by 
26We say that an accident is absolutely-utility-decreasing or simply utility-decreasing if 
uO(@) > q(G), for all @ > 0 and marginal-utility-decreasing if u&(G) > u;(O) for all @ > 0. 
The assumption that an accident is relatively-utility-decreasing implies, for instance, that an 
individual who has a limb severed and has it replaced by an artificial limb, and is compensated 
to the point where his marginal utility of income is the same as if his limb had not been severed, 
would still have preferred not to have the limb severed. 
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setting x0, xi, and 4. The consumer good is numeraire. We first treat the case 
Of: 
(i) Relatively-utility-decreasing accidents. Eq. (20) reduces to 
q - 1 = 7cf(Xl -x0). (B.3) 
The equation characterizing the individual’s choice of how many units of the 
accident-prevention good to buy is 
7c/(U1 -u()) - q(nui + (1 - 7c)ub) = 0. (B.4) 
The resource constraint is 
If one solves for the optimal values of x,, and xi, one obtains: 
u;=u;. 03.6) 
Let * denote values of variables at the symmetric information optimum. It 
may be checked that if the government sets 
q* = (4 - u%T 
(u?* 
= 7cs*(xT - xg*) + 1 
[from (B.3) (B.4) and (B.6)], x0 = xz and x1 = XT, then the individual will choose 
f*, and the symmetric information optimum will be attained. 
Upon reflection, this result is not surprising. Competitive equilibrium 
without government intervention fails to achieve the symmetric information 
optimum only because individuals, if they were provided with full insurance, 
would purchase an inefficient quantity of accident-prevention goods. This can 
be remedied directly by subsidizing or taxing these goods. If, with full 
insurance, the individual has an incentive both to purchase and to use the 
accident-prevention goods, then the government can achieve the symmetric 
information optimum by providing full insurance and adjusting the price of 
the accident-prevention goods so that the individual purchases the optimal 
amount. Accident-prevention effort, however, is different. Since it is untax- 
able, one can stimulate it only indirectly, by taxing substitutes and subsidiz- 
ing complements, which causes an efficiency loss relative to the symmetric 
information optimum. 
When the accident is relatively-utility-decreasing, the accident-prevention 
good will typically be subsidized. There is one circumstance in which the 
accident-prevention good should be taxed - if the accident is so relatively- 
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utility-decreasing that when ub =u;, x0 >x,; this case was explained in 
section 3.2 of the text. 
(ii) Relatively-utility-increasing accidents. In deriving the optimal tax for- 
mula, it was assumed that if an individual purchases a good, he will use it. 
With relatively-utility-increasing accidents, application of the optimal tax 
formulae gives that full insurance is provided and q=(u: -u,*)rrJ*/(n’)*, which 
is negative. The individual is better off if the accident occurs and to 
encourage him to purchase the accident-prevention good, it is necessary to 
set its price negative. This solution is satisfactory if the government can both 
monitor and enforce an individual’s use of the good.27 In many contexts, 
however, the costs of doing so would be prohibitive. Faced with a negative 
price, individuals would then buy as many units of the good as possible, 
since doing so, with a negative price, would increase income, but would not 
use them since utility is higher when an accident occurs. Thus, with 
relatively-utility-increasing accidents, the symmetric information optimum 
may not be attainable. If the government is unable to enforce usage, then to 
give individuals the incentive to employ accident-prevention goods, it is 
necessary that uO> ui. In this case, the asymmetric information optimum is 
the solution to 
max (1 - 4fMco) + 4fMcJ 
fvc,.c, 
s.t. 
(ii) uO=ul +A, 
where A is an arbitrarily small, positive number. Denote the solution to this 
problem by j: c”,, and c”,. The government can attain this optimum by setting 
the price of the accident-prevention good equal to 
qtf)A 
&= - rc(~)u;(E,)+(1-7c(~))U~(E,)’ 
(iii) Outcome-independent utility functions. The reader can check that in, 
this case the planner can come arbitrarily close to the symmetric social 
welfare optimum by setting u$ =u: +8, where 0 is an arbitrarily small 
positive number and then 4 = &c,*/(u’)*. 
“With enforcement costs, the most efficient method of compulsion would be to apply an 
infinitely large fine for non-compliance and to inspect for non-compliance with an infinitesmal 
but strictly positive probability. 
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